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INTRODUCTION
Continuity, as much as change, has marked the political economy of the former 
Soviet states within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Empirically, the 
tendency toward continuity is easy to record, since it can be seen in the delays and 
failures of marketization. Accounting for continuity is harder. Political factors have 
increasingly born the main weight of explaining why some states have lagged in the 
process of transformation. Whilst this a welcome development, the conception of politics 
and the range of variance explained leave much to be desired. Where comparison covers 
both Eastern Europe and the CIS, politics is reduced to institutional design – the 
executive/legislature design and electoral rules – and it is assumed that path dependence 
follows from choices made at the onset of reform path (Hellman, 1998; Fish, 1998). This 
discounts the influence of the communist past and the importance of political factors 
beyond the organization of central government, particularly the influence of structural 
factors and the incentives that they create. Alternatively, small-N comparative studies 
generally do not cover both Eastern Europe and the CIS since they concentrate on 
clusters of states such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, or single case studies 
(cf. Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999). The result of this is often that 
the past is often seen in very one-sided terms. Comparison of similar systems can often 
lead to structural phenomena being underanalyzed – again – since they are held to be 
constant across the small range of cases and are seen additions to the complex local 
patterns of interaction and power, rather than factors that might shape such interactions. 
The way that small-N comparisons of path dependency write phenomena such as global 
economy and the state out of the picture make it difficult, as Böhle (2000, p.246) has 
argued, to be sure that small-N path dependency arguments have properly identified 
‘which elements of the past matter, and exactly how they matter’. 
This paper does not dispute the crucial importance of politics in explaining the 
variety of post-communist outcomes, and in particular, the relative backwardness of the 
CIS in comparison to Eastern Europe. However, it argues that what constitutes political 
influence upon post-communist political economy needs to be broadened out. It argues 
that a crucial factor influencing reform has been the type of state formed by the 
interaction of communist system and the international economy before the collapse of 
communism. The paper defends this position by first, defining ideal-type classifications 
of state that can be used to distinguish between the classic Stalinist system, the evolving 
communist state, and the object of market reform. It argues that different forms of state 
emerged during the communist period as elites tried to balance the failings of central 
planning and the classic form of communist state with external assistance. Some of these 
forms of communist state produced conditions that made them amenable to marketization 
through their interaction with the global economy. These conditions were more prevalent 
in Central and Eastern Europe than in the CIS. As a result, the possibility of market 
change has been greater there than in the CIS since elites are more vulnerable to pressure 
from their domestic populations and external agencies, and have incentives to lead 
reform. In the CIS, where the state evolved more slowly, change has been more sluggish. 
Although there has been variance in patterns of change across the FSU, the lack of 
evolution in the past has enabled a far greater degree of continuity at the expense of 
economic and political pluralism.
2Table 1 State types
State type Main source of revenue Autonomy Constraints on revenue 
generation
Property State-owned property Formally high, actually low Formally low, in practice 
high due to control 
problems
Rentier External sources High Externally generated
Tax General tax of independent 
economic activity
Embedded and relative Political as well as 
economic
IDEAL-TYPES OF STATE, COMMUNISM AND THE POST-COMMUNIST 
POLICY AGENDA: PROPERTY STATES, RENTIER STATES AND TAX 
STATES
Although the importance of the state in transition has become increasingly apparent 
over the last decade, conceptualizations of the communist and post-communist state as an 
explanatory variable have not been developed. One reason for this that the classificatory 
schemas of communist studies were concerned with regime definition, rather than with 
the power of the state per se. The usefulness of concepts derived from communist studies 
is therefore purely historical since they do not describe variance over any longer time; 
once the regimes that they described collapsed so did the explanatory potential of 
concepts from communist studies as diverse as totalitarianism (at one end of the 
spectrum) and institutional pluralism (at the other). Concepts of state and state power that 
can help to re-establish the state as a conceptual variable must be able to work across the 
historical divide to account for both continuity and change.
Given the changing nature of institutions and purposes, the best way to look at 
change over time is to concentrate on functions of the state. These can be divided up in 
many ways, but its most direct economic functions are redistributive and involve taxation 
and resource allocation. Taxation and resource allocation can be achieved in a variety of 
ways and through a variety of mechanisms. In essence, these can be reduced to revenue 
generation through the general taxation of independent economic activity, or through 
appropriation of revenue taken by the state by right due to ownership. The latter type of 
revenue collection can take two forms: it can either be taken directly from the 
appropriation of revenue from domestic producers who work the economy on behalf of 
the state, or it can come from external sources. These external sources can be trade 
revenues from the sale of resources owned by the state, or grant aid from other states.
The latter distinctions are fundamental to the form that the state takes and correlate 
significantly with the form in which revenue is taken. These are summarized as ideal 
types in Table 1. Ideal-typically, states that take revenue as property-owners from 
domestic economic activity are property states. States that take revenue from external 
sources are rentier states, although there is an important distinction to be drawn between 
those that take rent from the sale of commodities that they own, and those that take rent 
3through aid and external subsidy and are therefore constrained by the wishes of their 
benefactors. States that take revenue from independent economic activity in monetary 
form are tax states. 
Rentier (especially the commodity traders) and property states are alike in that they 
have a high degree of autonomy from the societies that they govern by virtue of their 
taking revenue as a right. However, under certain conditions, the autonomy of rentier 
states is higher than that of property states and the rate of taxation that they take from 
domestic sources is lower. Where rentier states take rent from the export of a small range 
of commodities, they are more minimally involved in the production systems of their 
domestic economies, and classically, as result of low domestic taxes, are not responsive 
to domestic pressure. Indeed, society is a supplicant to the state since access to external 
rents is conditional on access to state institutions. This leads to patron-client relations as 
officials use externally generated rents to insure political loyalty and creates forms of 
patrimonial regime in which office holding is proprietary. The interest of officials in the 
future of the domestic economy is also minimal since extracting resources from society is 
not the chief means that the state has of gaining resources that can be used to barter for 
political support. There is, as a result, a tendency in rentier states to allow domestic 
economy to stagnate relative to economic competition. This has relatively little impact on 
the state’s ability to collect resources. The constraint on revenue collection for rentier 
states is set externally, either by market prices for the resources that they sell, or 
politically by the willingness of other states to transfer resources to them in the form of 
aid and loans (Crystal, 1990; Ross, 2001, pp.329-32; Shambayati, 1994; Yates, 1996). 
Property states, on the other hand, are autonomous in that they take revenue as a 
right, but are faced with principal-agent control problems. Property states are desirous of 
fostering economic growth in order that they may increase the surplus that they take from 
society. This growth may be insured by coercing agents that manage property to use it in 
ways that produce growth. This imposes a limit to growth since the costs of regulation 
may be high and coercion can have a negative effect where it destroys trust and heightens 
uncertainty. The alternative is for the state as principal to negotiate for political support 
from its economic agents. These negotiations weaken the autonomy of property states in 
practice in the economic sphere since they restrict the demands that it can make. The 
autonomy of tax states is always relative since the state is too a greater or lesser extent 
embedded in the community that it governs; the tax state ‘can never be its own end but 
only a machine for those common purposes’ that individuals ‘are unwilling or unable to 
take over’ (Schumpeter, 1991, p.110). All forms of state have limits on the amounts of 
revenue that they can raise (Olson, 2000). In the tax state, these limits are not just 
economic in that both indirect and most direct taxes have a maximum yield beyond 
which the revenue of the state will fall, but political, in that the state’s coercive power to 
extract will be limited by its regard for others’ property rights. Where this respect is 
breached, the state’s tax base will shrink, as economic activity will decrease. The tax 
state is thus the antithesis of the property state. Where the property state fuses economy 
and politics so that politics drives economic activity and sets it objectives directly, the tax 
state regulates economic activity indirectly through the system of revenue collection and 
under political constraint.
Central planning created the closest thing in the modern era to an ideal-typical 
property state. Revenue was derived from property owned by the state in the form of 
4profits from state-owned enterprises and kept high through the regulation of wages and 
consumer prices by the state; the government basically and according to need set the 
price of goods higher than money wages and took the difference as tax (McKinnon, 
1992; Olson, 2000). Tax payments were thus made between branches of the state in the 
main; the fiscal survival of the state did not depend on the state’s capacity to appropriate 
surplus through taxes on the private sector. The system of taxation in the Stalinist system 
was thus largely implicit and potentially the state was able to manipulate prices and 
wages to generate high revenues. The fact that money did not play a true accounting 
function as prices were arbitrarily determined by central planners and there were strict 
political limits to what could be done with money generated by enterprises and 
individuals contributed to this significantly by enabling a greater manipulation of wages 
and consumption. This form of taxation generated a large amount of revenue and 
investment for a time, but at the cost of low total factor productivity. This low total factor 
productivity, and the other problems associated with planning, meant that overtime the 
economy stagnated so that the state’s ability to generate large amounts of revenue 
declined. This tendency of revenue to fall overtime was compounded by collusion 
between bureaucrats and the existence of soft-budget constraints, both of which 
negatively affected state finances by creating a situation in which a high level of revenue 
had to be diverted to combat the misappropriation of state resources, or by preventing the 
maximization of revenue generation through the promotion of efficiency (Urban, 1985; 
Kornai, 1986). Coercion protected the state’s ability top extract resources, but it was not 
enough to resolve all of the principal-agent control problems created by the vastness of 
the state’s holdings. As a result, not all decisions that were made in the economy were 
economically rational. The setting of prices and the shortages that resulted from this and 
from breakdowns in production lead to administratively generated rents, which could be 
used to buy political support at the cost of economic efficiency (Lazarev and Gregory, 
2003). This was, however, self-defeating. The inefficient allocation of resources meant 
that growth slowed and the amount of resources available for reallocation shrank relative 
to demand. In turn, this threatened a net reduction in political loyalty amongst the 
population at large. Moreover, those actors who did not share in the exchange of gifts for 
loyalty tried to appropriate a part of administratively generated rents for their own use. 
Both of these problems exacerbated the problem of investment hunger that was intrinsic 
to the communist order due to its desire for modernization and the absence of self-
restraint on demands for investment such as exist in capitalist economies where 
investment, in the form of borrowed money, has to be repaid through the generation of 
profit (Kornai, 1992, pp.162-3). Shortages of investment resources delayed the 
completion of investment projects and led to high investment levels at the cost of 
consumption and general economic performance (Hewett, 1988, pp.89-90). 
Problems of control and associated economic dysfunctions led the communist state to 
evolve, a point we will return to below. However, even when there was evolution, the 
fact that central planning remained the main mechanism for distributing resources and 
collecting revenue meant that communist systems never totally escaped from some 
conformity to the property state ideal. Ending central planning and recreating private 
enterprise after the collapse of the party-state as a political regime meant creating a new 
form of state and revenue collection. Creating the outlines of a tax state has been an aim 
and aspiration of reform policies in the post-communist world. This desire was 
5heightened by the aspiration to democracy, since the consolidation of democratic 
governance requires economic pluralism to support political pluralism (Linz and Stepan, 
1996, pp.11-13). Property and most forms of rentier state do not support economic 
pluralism, since political forces dominate the distribution of resources and pluralism is 
consequently curtailed. Tax states may also have considerable resources to distribute, and 
this may have major economic affects. However, this tends not to inhibit economic 
pluralism since the amount of revenue that they can take and hence redistribute, is 
constrained by the effect that tax has on private economic activity. Finally, moving 
toward creating tax states was a strategic matter for post-communist politicians. 
Collecting revenue in the form of money raised from private economic activity instead of 
from ownership meant changing the relationship that money had to economic activity 
under central planning. Collecting revenue from private economic activity involves the 
creation of money as a universal, transferable, transparent means of exchange, and erodes 
soft budget constraints and the use rights to property that managers and political 
appointees hold because of their office. Moving toward the tax state ideal thus involved 
breaking down the power of old elites to some degree, and at least as a construct of 
economic culture, and counterbalancing it with both new social groups who had access to 
money, and the state, which controls the production of money and its use through 
taxation (Woodruff, 1999). Redistribution of resources would not be achieved by 
manipulating prices as under central planning, but could be either direct, through state 
expenditure on welfare etc, or indirect through the setting taxes, interest rates and 
exchange policies. The constraints on political power and the revenue generating power 
of the state would thus change. Instead of being constrained by the problems of principal-
agent control, the state would be constrained by the rights of economic agents to hold 
property (which sets an absolute level to taxation after all), and by the demands that 
would be made on the state by taxpayers for public goods.
A country’s ability to move from something approaching the property state ideal after 
communism to something approaching the tax state ideal is influenced by the extent to 
which the property state was undermined under communism by the development of 
rentierist elements. The combination of property state and rentier models under 
communism created constraints on post-communist elites and incentives to change. The 
greater the extent of rentierism underpinning the property state, the more elites were 
dependent on maintaining resources flows from abroad to maintain social peace. This 
made maintaining the credibility of economic reform important so that access to aid and 
investment was not compromised. Moreover, the fact that rents were earned on a broad 
selection of goods in Eastern Europe provided for some basic economic pluralism. The 
more sources of rent in a country, the more they are likely to balance out patrimonial 
tendencies built on control over a single rent source. The more diverse trade was, the 
more competing sources of power emerge. Diversity also creates incentives to co-
operate, insures a level political playing field in which the state provides pubic rather 
than private goods.  Such a political arena can reduce the vulnerability of economic 
agents to changes in international markets and demand for their goods. The provision of 
public goods such as low inflation, efficient and equitable economic arbitration etc can 
help to balance international with domestic demand by creating conditions for domestic 
economic growth. The same is true of rent gathered in the form of loans and aid. The use 
of these is constrained, first, by lenders setting conditions of use and by their often-public 
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asymmetries in information and influence, but they provide more scope for the balancing 
out of patrimonial interests than rent from the trade of a narrow range of commodities. 
Second, elites are constrained in that they frequently need to be able to roll debt over or 
defer repayment. Consequently, they need to insure a degree of stability in order to avoid 
default. Finally, the liberalization of trade controls can amplify these effects. Those 
sectors of the economy that did not enjoy access to foreign markets were desirous of 
sharing the resources and potential to increase consumption that openness might bring. 
The prospect that they might lose through increased liberalization both through 
competition and because of the end of implicit subsidies provided via the redistribution 
of rent by central planners was hidden by the manipulation of domestic prices before the 
introduction of stabilization policies. The fact that there might be some penetration of 
international price incentives in to domestic economy would also lend weight to moves 
to collect taxes in money and the creation of money as a universal, transferable, 
transparent means of exchange. 
Rentierism therefore created something akin to domestic constituencies for change 
and as a result neutralized the collective action problems of reform.1 As a result, it also 
created the potential not only for moving beyond some approximation of the property 
state, but also for its own demise. Where rentierism was extensive and involved a mix of 
commodities and debt/loans, reform could be locked in as both state actors and economic 
agents would be unable to perpetuate rentierism as a source of patrimonial power. In this 
co-operation and in the breakdown of patrimonial power that it entailed, lay the seeds of 
new tax states. The demise of patrimonial power and the willingness to cede decision-
making to the state in the hope that it might provide stability and insure access to 
resources were essential to the construction of state autonomy within new political limits. 
Material incentives created by the undermining of the property state form embedded the 
new state autonomy in social consensus – no matter how rudimentary – about change, 
and connected that consensus to material as well as emotive, anti-communist interests. 
Where development of rentierism was low or skewed towards rent from the sale of a 
single or small number of commodities, incentives are more likely to be to extend some 
form of patrimonialism in order to protect the riches that accrue from trade by buying 
loyalty. This was the case in parts of the FSU, although the fragmentation of the Soviet 
economic space has meant that there has not been a straightforward course to rentierism 
across the region, a point that we will return to below. 
THE EVOLVING COMMUNIST STATE: THE PROPERTY/RENTIER MIX 
AND THE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE 
USSR
In terms of structural economic problems, the evolution of the communist state was 
uniform in origin but diverse in outcome. Evolution was stimulated by internal factors, 
the failings of central planning as a system of control, the buy-offs and inefficiencies that 
resulted from this, and in the case of the USSR in particular, the exigencies of military 
1 On these see Hellman, 1998; Robinson, 2002.
7competition. Communist leaders were constrained both to maintain high levels of 
investment to maintain growth and to fund growth in consumption. The latter was necessary 
both for ideological and practical reasons; as socialism was constructed and consolidated, 
there had to be a material pay-off for to the population; practically some increase in the 
amount of resources allocated to consumption was necessary to create incentives, and in 
Eastern Europe in order to maintain social control (Bunce, 1985, pp.8-9). 
The combination of investment hunger and pressure to raise levels of consumption 
meant that some way of compensating for the shortcoming of the property state model 
had to be found. Reform was one solution. This, however, was complicated and 
politically difficult, as first Khrushchev and later Gorbachev discovered. In between 
these efforts at change, it was administratively much easier to develop aspects of 
rentierism in parallel with the property state. This was administratively easy because of 
the way that the party-state controlled the articulation of their domestic economy with the 
global economy (Evangelista, 1996). The centralized nature of foreign trade 
administration meant that communist states automatically acted as rentier states, no 
matter what the structure of their trade with the outside world. Revenue from export sales 
went to the central foreign trade organization, with the government then deciding what to 
redistribute to producers. The potential for raising revenue through exports was also great 
because of the state’s control over prices. This enabled them to manipulate the domestic 
costs of production to effectively dump goods on the world market and secure export 
income. Communist rentierism was very varied, however. There were differences in what 
was traded, and differences in the forms that rent took, with some state receiving both 
rent from ownership and substantial rent from aid and subsidies, and differences in 
security rents. Finally, communist states dealt with the problems caused by rentierism in 
different ways. These different strategies combined with the different forms that 
rentierism took created different social pressures and opened them up to different 
external pressures. In nearly each case, the major dividing line was between the USSR 
and the rest of the bloc.
The most obvious of these differences were in the rents generated by trade and 
security. All of the states of Eastern Europe took security rents from the USSR in that 
they did not pay the full costs of protecting themselves from the external security threat 
of capitalism. These security rents were generated by accident and design. Eastern 
European states had no incentive to contribute towards defence, and to structure their 
collection of revenue accordingly, since the USSR spent in excess of what was necessary 
to provide for security and because the system of collective security was imposed by the 
USSR. Moreover, Eastern European states could save on defence expenditure and take 
rent from the USSR in order to fund domestic consumption to avoid social unrest. They 
could therefore play off the USSR’s contradictory desires for bloc security through 
military might and bloc security through systemic stability (Eyal, 1992, p.44; Bunce, 
1992, p.14). 
Differences in trade rents between the USSR and Eastern Europe were equally great. 
All communist states, by virtue of their ownership of production and control over 
domestic prices, took rent from foreign trade no matter what the commodities and the 
value added to them in production. However, there were very great differences in what 
states took rent on and the contributions of rent to national income. The first difference is 
8Table 2 Exports to the West in 1990 (% of total trade)
Commodity group USSR Eastern Europe
Primary Products
of which:
Food
Raw materials (excluding fuels)
23.1
 2.4
 8.9
28.5
16.9
  5.1
Mineral fuels
of which:
Oil
Gas
56.5
40.6
11.7
10.7
 5.6
 0.1
Manufactures
Semi-manufactures
of which:
Iron and steel
Chemicals
Machinery and transport equipment and goods
of which:
Road vehicles
Transport equipment
Specialized machinery
Industrial consumer goods
of which
Textiles
Clothing
14.4
  9.5
 2.6
 4.4
 3.4
 1.6
 1.0
 0.7
 1.5
  0.4
  0.0
60.0
21.4
 7.2
 9.3
13.6
 1.6
 6.8
 4.8
25.0
 3.4
 9.8
Source: Lavigne, 1999, p.85
that the USSR was a source of rent for Eastern Europe. The extent to which the USSR 
subsidized its trade with Eastern Europe is contentious, but the USSR began to provide 
subsidies from sometime in the late 1950s as it charged low prices fro energy exports and 
allowed its terms of trade with Eastern Europe to deteriorate (Smith, 1992, pp.86-89; 
Bunce, 1986, p.12). Even when Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe improved in 
the late 1970s as the prices of energy rose, the USSR still charged under world market 
prices for exports to Eastern Europe (on average about 70-80 per cent of OPEC prices) 
(Bunce, 1986, p.17). 
The second main difference between the USSR and Eastern Europe was in the 
structure of trade and its importance as a source of rent. These are summarized in Tables 
2 and 3. The USSR’s external trade was relatively uniform in that the bulk of its exports 
were and export revenue derived from the sale of energy abroad. The USSR had traded 
raw materials, particularly oil, for foreign currency revenue almost from its inception, but 
the extent of this trade was small until the 1970s. Then, as trade between the USSR and 
the outside world grew spectacularly, the USSR took advantage of high oil prices after 
1973 to reap huge profits, using this money to fund consumption rises and cushion 
industry from change. Trade between Eastern Europe and market economies played the 
same function, but was of a very different structure, magnitude and impact. As with the 
USSR, the extent to which eastern European states traded outside of the communist bloc 
9Table 3 Exports and national income under central planning (%)
USSR Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Czechoslovakia
1967 3.9 28 40 20 17 30
1980 8 40 54 31 27 29
1986 8 42 58 32 20 32
Source: adapted from Lavigne, 1991, p.14
increased in general from the 1960s onwards. This was in part inspired by the USSR, 
which wanted to decrease the costs to its economy of subsidizing the economic systems 
of Eastern Europe. As Table 3 shows, the amount contributed to national income by 
exports rose significantly across the region in the 1970s, but with a marked difference 
between the USSR and Eastern Europe in terms of its contribution to national income 
(see also Collins and Rodrik, 1992, pp.31-3). The structure of trade was very different to 
that between the USSR and industrialized market economies. As Table 2 shows, the 
spread of traded goods was much broader in Eastern Europe, although with intra-regional 
variation, than for the USSR. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland had relatively diverse 
trade structures, with a balance between the exports of consumer, machinery, raw 
materials and semi-manufactures, and agricultural goods. Bulgaria and Romania were 
more similar to the USSR in that their export trade outside the socialist bloc was more 
dependent on primary goods and was relatively uniform in structure.2 As a result, the 
degree to which their economies were penetrated by external economic forces was more 
limited. Overall, however, the impact of foreign trade on Eastern Europe was much 
greater than it was in the USSR, as Table 3 shows. This combined with the structure of 
commodities traded, made Eastern European economies far more vulnerable to changes 
in world markets. Although they spread the risk far more than the USSR did with its 
energy dependent trade, the terms of trade for Eastern European states were much worse 
than for the USSR in the late 1970s. Economic downturn in the West after 1973 and the 
rise in oil prices meant that the USSR’s terms of trade improved by over 100 per cent 
2 The structure of east European trade is difficult to compare since different national agencies used 
different categories. However, the statistics are indicative of certain essential differences between states 
with trade uniformity and states with trade diversity. Hungary’s exports to developed states were evenly 
divided between machinery (27.1 per cent) raw materials and semi-manufactures (33.8 per cent) 
consumer goods (16.1per cent) food and agricultural products (20.7 per cent). Czechoslovakia’s exports 
to non-socialist states were likewise evenly divided between machinery (23.8 percent) fuels, minerals 
and metals (20.3 per cent) chemicals (13.5 per cent) raw materials and semi-manufactures (33.8 per cent) 
consumer goods (20.3) and food and agricultural products (8.2 per cent). Poland demonstrated the most 
diversity with fuel and energy accounting for 13.8 per cent of exports to developed states, metallurgy 
12.2 per cent, engineering 23.0 per cent, chemicals 11.5 per cent, light industrial goods 8.1 per cent, 
processed food 12.9 per cent and agricultural products 6.5 per cent. Romania and Bulgaria on the other 
hand displayed less diversity. Romania’s commodity structure of convertible currency trade was 
dominated by fuels, minerals and metals, which accounted for 47.8 pr cent of export trade; the same 
sector accounted for 36.8 per cent of Bulgaria’s trade to developed states, with a further 19.6 per cent 
accounted for by raw materials and agricultural products. Romania and Bulgaria therefore show a degree 
of uniformity in the commodity structure of their trade in comparison to the other CEE states. All figures 
are for 1988, except for Bulgaria, where the figures are for 1990. Sources are EIU country profiles, 
1990-1991 and OECD, 1992.
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between 1974 and 1980, whereas for Eastern Europe they deteriorated by 20-25 per cent 
(Lavigne, 1991, p.41).
The centrality of exports to national income in Eastern Europe and the decline in the 
terms of trade in the 1970s exacerbated the systemic tendency for trade between 
communist and capitalist states to lead to the former’s indebtedness because of the low 
quality of production in communist states and the hunger for imports caused by 
investment shortages (Kornai, 1992, pp.349-50). As the terms of trade declined, trade 
rents were increasingly buttressed by loans from capitalist states. The growth of loans 
was rapid in the 1970s, rising from US$6.5 billion in 1970 to US$88.1 billion in 1981 
(Bunce, 1985, p.38). The spread of the debt burden was very uneven as can be seen in 
Table 4, with Hungary and Poland particularly hard hit. The USSR’s foreign debt also 
grew rapidly during this period, but proportionately it was much less than the debt of 
nearly all the Eastern European states through the period, and was actually a smaller 
amount than Poland’s debt (Lavigne, 1991, p.344). As Table 4 shows, debts for the most 
part continued to grow in the 1980s, and ability to service debt declined as debt-service 
ratios grew. Again, the USSR bucked the trend, its debt-service ratio being below 5 per 
cent for the period (Lavigne, 1991, p.328). 
The forms of external rent taken across the communist world to shore up their 
economic systems were thus very different. Differences in how rentierism developed was 
linked to the different strategies that emerged for dealing with its problems. In some 
cases, strategy and the development of rentierism went more or less hand in hand; the 
development of relative economic liberalism in Hungary from the late 1960s and the 
expansion of its trade and debt over the course of the 1970s would be a case in point. In 
other cases, strategy developed haphazardly, as in Romania where loan rents were 
foregone in favour of trade rents that could reduce debt, albeit at the cost of domestic 
consumption in the 1980s. The mix of strategies that emerged complicates the nature of 
the property/rentier mix in Eastern Europe as communism moved to its terminal stage in 
the late 1980s since it created different foreign trade regimes in the region, with some 
states moving toward decentralization. However, we can classify the property/rentier 
state mix in across the region by comparing the degree to which rentierism had become a 
vital part of the economic systems of the states of Eastern Europe. This classificatory 
schema is laid out in Table 5. The property/rentier state mix can be high, medium or low, 
according to the balance between the ratio of exports to national income, debt and debt-
service ratio, and the degree to which the economy was penetrated by the global 
economy though a state’s possessing a relatively diverse and balanced commodity export 
structure.3
How states in the region actually mixed the two ideal-type forms is listed in Table 6. 
The USSR and Romania had a low mix of rentier and property state forms, with 
relatively uniform sectoral exports that insured that the degree to which their economies 
were penetrated by rentierist elements was insignificant. Poland and Hungary, with their 
high levels of debt, debt-service, exports to national-income ratio and decentralized 
foreign trade regimes were at the other end of the spectrum and had diverse and 
relatively balanced foreign trade commodity structure that insured a wide domestic
3 Security rents and trade subsidies are left out since they were imposed and uniform, and they predated the 
evolution of the communist state in most of the area.
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Table 4 East European debt
Net debta Debt-service ratiob
1982 1989 1981 1989
Bulgaria   3,912   7,957   21 48
Czechoslovakia   4,097   5,724   17 23
Hungary 10,344 18,015   42 49
Poland 27,033 35,890 163 76
Romania   9,581 -1,254   36 19
a  US$ millions at 1989 exchange rate
b Debt-service ratio: all interest and amortization on medium and long-term debt as a 
percentage of one year’s exports
Source: Baylis, 1994, pp.251-2 
 
Table 5 Property/rentier state mixes
Property/rentier state 
mix
Characteristics
High Predominately high ratio of exports to national income; high debt and debt-
service ratio; high penetration of economy by rentierist elements through export 
trade diversity.
Medium Mixture of high and low ratio of exports to national income; debt and debt-
service ratio; penetration of economy by rentierist elements through export trade 
diversity.
Low Predominately low ratio exports to national income; low debt and debt-service 
ratio; low penetration of economy by rentierist elements due to limited export 
trade diversity.
Table 6 Property/rentier state mixes at the end of communism
Export/ 
national 
income ratio Debt
Debt-
service 
ratio
Rentierist penetration of 
economy through export 
trade structure
Property/rentier 
state mix
Bulgaria High Low High Low Medium
Czechoslovakia High Low Low High Medium
Hungary High High High High High
Poland High High High High High
Romania Low Low Low Low Low
USSR Low Low Low Low Low
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interaction with the global economy. Bulgaria also had a high degree of rentierism, but 
without the support of a diverse and relatively balanced foreign trade commodity 
structure so that although it demonstrated high rentierist elements its domestic economy 
was relatively isolated from global influences. Czechoslovakia mixed elements of both 
property and rentier forms, but unlike Bulgaria, this was more balanced by its more 
diverse and even sectoral trade patterns.
There is not space here to go through the various ways in which the different patterns 
of interaction with the global economy and property/rentier state mixes worked 
themselves out case by case. We can see, however, the basic outcomes that they helped 
to generate. A high or medium mixture mix of rentierism with property state forms was 
not in and of itself enough to guarantee more rapid movement towards reform. Although 
rentierism was important in breaking down the property state, it was only effective as a 
support for reform where there was a diverse set of sectors involved in exports so that 
there was penetration of the domestic economy across a broad front. Czechoslovakia was 
thus in a better position than Bulgaria. Bulgaria, due to the low degree to which it was 
actually penetrated by rentierist elements, had more in common with Romania. The 
transition was much smoother in Bulgaria, where the property state form was more 
compromised, than in Romania, where it was stronger, but both had relatively uniform 
sectoral export structures so that collapse was not followed by rapid reform progress. 
Poland and Hungary, and the more penetrated Czechoslovakia were thus in the best 
position to implement reforms, whilst the Soviet successor states and Romania had less 
to support a reform drive. 
The overall patterns of economic change can be seen in tables 7 and 8. Table 7 shows 
how a high rentier/property state mix, or a medium mix with a diverse trade structure 
eased the path of reform in the first years of transition (until mid-1995 in Table 7). 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czechoslovak successor states scored more highly on reform 
indicators such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development measures 
reported in table 7, were more open and privatized than states with low property/rentier 
mixes, or low penetration by rentierism. In Russia, the CIS, Romania and Bulgaria, with 
their low mixes, or weak penetration by rentierism, progress towards reform was slower, 
although the latter two states opened up their economies more speedily than Russia and 
the CIS. Constructing a tax state requires a broad array of reforms to be implemented in 
both the economy and the political system. However, we can get some idea of the 
success in moving from one state form to another by looking at the general stability of 
government finances, which with some caveats can be taken as a proxy measure of 
progress towards the tax state ideal.  Table 8 shows progress towards stabilization of 
government finances. Where the property/rentier mix was low, or was medium but with 
little depth, government finances suffered greater deficits in the early years of reform 
(1990-1992 in Eastern Europe, 1992-1994 in the CIS), than they did where there was a 
high property/rentier mix, or where the mix was medium but deep. In the latter cases, 
state finances have been relatively steady, with moderate deficits across the reform years. 
The absence of great shocks despite the experience of transitional recession highlights 
the ability of these states to take resources relatively effectively despite change in the 
economic system. Elsewhere, however, the picture is very mixed. States that had energy 
resources suffered less than states that had a weaker resource base. Hence, Romania fares 
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Table 7 Property/rentier state mixes at the end of communism and initial post-communist 
economic performance to mid-1995
Property/rentier mix and 
trade structure
EBRD reform 
indicator averagea
EBRD measure of trade and 
foreign exchange liberalizationa
Private sector 
share of GDP (%)
Low and uniform
Russia 2.55 3 55
CIS average 1.97 2.6 27
Romania 2.44 5 40
Medium and uniform
Bulgaria 2.55 4 45
Medium and diverse
Czech Republic 3.66 5 70
Slovakia 3.44 5 60
High and diverse
Hungary 3.66 5 60
Poland 3.55 5 60
a Scale of 1 to 5, with 5 as the highest
Source: calculated from EBRD, 1995, p.11
Table 8 Post-communist government balances, (% of GDP)
Property/rentier mix and 
trade structure 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2000
Low
Armenia -37.6 -48.2 -16.1 -6.3
Azerbaijan    2.8 -13.0 -18.0 -0.6
Belarus -1.6 -8.3 -1.5  0.3
Georgia -3.0 -28.0 -34.0 -4.1
Kazakhstan -7.3 -1.2 -6.5 -1.0
Kyrgyzstan -17.4 -13.5 -8.4 -9.6
Moldova -23.4 -8.8 -8.0 -2.6
Romania na -1.9 -4.4 -3.7
Russia -31.0 -18.8 -7.6  3.0
Tajikistan -29.9 -24.7 -6.4 -0.6
Turkmenistan  13.2 -0.5 -1.1  0.4
Ukraine -30.4 -10.1 -8.6 -1.3
Uzbekistan -12.0 -20.0 -2.0 -1.2
Medium and uniform
Bulgaria -12.8 -14.7 -15.0 -1.0
Medium and diverse
Czechoslovakia    0.1 -2.0 -3.3
Czech Rep -4.2
Slovakia -3.6
High and diverse
Hungary    0.5 -2.2 -5.6 -3.3
Poland    3.1 -6.5 -6.7 -3.2
Sources: EBRD, 1995, pp.188-211; EBRD, 2002, pp.117-217
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better Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan better than Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. 
In certain cases, at the end of the 1990s, government balances were even positive where 
the price of energy boosted economies (as in Russia). This does not signify that there has 
been progress, however, but that these states have been able to control energy rents in 
new rentier forms that have pushed aside remnants of the old property state form without 
giving birth to new tax state forms. 
PATTERNS OF POST-SOVIET RENTIERISM
The acceleration of economic crisis under Gorbachev increased Soviet interaction 
with the global economy, but they did not touch the economy of the post-Soviet state 
uniformly. As oil prices fell in the late 1980s and import prices remained stable, the 
central state budget was heavily squeezed. The Soviet state was running a yearly budget 
deficit of about 9 per cent of GDP in the late 1980s (EIU, 1991, p.37). Foreign borrowing 
–‘chaotic and large-scale’ during this period – covered some of the central state’s 
revenue shortfall as the USSR’s short-term foreign debt doubled between the end of 1987 
and the end of 1989 alone (Lushin and Oppenheimer, 2001, p.288; IMF et al, 1991a, 
p.40). Gorbachev further tried to alleviate crisis by opening up the Soviet economy, but 
the results were not impressive (Robinson, 1999). These reforms did not fundamentally 
alter the property/rentier mix, therefore, and as a result, there were no powerful new 
incentives structures that might have strengthened pressure for change from either below 
or from within the state. Post-Soviet leaders were not faced with the same external and 
internal constraints as their counterparts in Eastern Europe. There was only weak 
involvement of outside parties, whether international financial agencies or private 
economic actors in the USSR at the start of the post-communist period.
In the absence of strong pressures to change, the most powerful incentives were to 
insure continuity. There were exceptions to this for some state actors, most notably the 
Russian effort at reform in 1992. This exception proves the rule, however. Russia’s drive 
towards the market through shock therapy was a response to the weakness of the Yeltsin 
government in the face of domestic economic forces and an effort at reconnecting with 
the global economy to balance out domestic producers’ power (Robinson, 1999). The 
failure of this dash to the market, and the subsequent reconciliation of the Russian 
government with a part of the economic elite and transfer of energy resources to them, 
showed that there was not a domestic constituency in the Russia large enough to support 
market reform in the first instance. Moreover, exogenous economic agents, private and 
supra-governmental, did not have the same amount of leverage on the Russian 
government that they had elsewhere, especially since Russia was able to secure resources 
from the international community for foreign policy reasons (Stone, 2002). 
Outside of Russia, insuring continuity was less controversial from the onset of 
independence. Independence, and the consequent fragmentation of the old Soviet pattern 
of interaction with the world economy, meant that insuring continuity was going to be 
difficult, however. The collapse of the system for redistributing the USSR’s trade rents 
was not accompanied by end of the requirement to channel resources to society. Unlike 
model rentier states, the new rulers of the CIS could not buy-off their populations 
through low tax policies coupled with selective distribution of resources in the form of 
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patronage to elites. Social peace was not maintained by the state standing apart from 
private economic activity and taking little form it in the way of tax, but through the state 
providing basic welfare. Post-Soviet rulers thus had a difficult balancing act to achieve if 
they were to buy-off both elites and their populations. To achieve this they consolidated 
aspects of the communist rentier state model, albeit with new regional variations.
The chief variation has been in the depth to which rentierism has taken hold and the 
degree to which it has structured government.  The first divide is between those states 
that have complex economies and are not reliant on one or two key imports, and those 
states that are more classic rentiers in their dependence on energy and primary product 
sales. The latter have developed patrimonial and personalistic regimes to a greater extent 
than the former. Energy rents have been the main source of patrimonial and personalistic 
power, although in some states, most notably Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, considerable 
rents have accrued from cotton as well, or from other forms of mineral wealth such as 
gold in Kyrgyzstan. States where energy rents have played a significant role are listed in 
Table 9. There is obviously a high degree of variance between the extents that energy 
sales contribute rent across the CIS. In Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, energy 
rents have been very high as a proportion of GDP. In Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, these 
rents have gone to government directly and then been redistributed (sometimes). In 
Uzbekistan, where large rents were also available from the cotton sector, they have been 
used to give subsidies to consumers, rather than accumulated as direct revenue flows to 
the state. Kazakhstan has taken revenue less from exports, but has compensated by 
allowing large FDI inflows into the energy sector. This strategy, shared by Azerbaijan, was 
a response to political threats, particularly regional divisions, and a lack of alternative rent 
sources. In order to quell potential threats and stimulate a rapid inflow of some resources 
from the one rent source that they had, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan privatized their 
energy sectors to create short-term rent flows that could more immediately be used for 
patronage (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2001).
Table 9 Energy exports and rents, 2000
Oil and gas export 
as % of total 
exports
Oil and gas 
export as % 
of GDP
Oil and gas as % of 
total government 
revenue
FDI in oil 
and gas as % 
of total FDI
Energy rents 
1992-2000 as 
% of GDP
Azerbaijan 85.2 30.5 36.2 80.5 50.2
Kazakhstan 46.8 24.7 27.5 69.7 20.9
Russia 50.4 21.5 30.1 10.7 26.0
Turkmenistan 81 69.7 42.0 44.4
Uzbekistan 12.3 4.3 14.8 39.5
Source: Esanov et al, 2001, pp.4, 5
No matter how rent has been taken, the effect, roughly, has been the same: 
personalistic regimes have developed based on patrimonial power. The extent of 
personalistic regime development has varied. Where there has been more state control 
and less privatization, the degree of authoritarianism has been more extensive. This 
pattern has produced authoritarian regimes in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, whilst the 
opening up of the economy and competition over resources has produced illiberal, but 
not fully authoritarian, regimes in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Ishiyama, 2002). Case by 
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case, how rents have been used to buy-off opposition has varied. Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have cushioned their populations against GDP falls. The 
estimated GDP ratios in 2001 compared to 1989 of in the three states was respectively 
105, 96 and 84 per cent; the CIS average is 64 per cent (EBRD 2002, p.58). Azerbaijan, 
on the other hand, has not cushioned its population in general from falling GDP, but has 
channelled the money to economic elites by keeping enterprises profitable, despite high 
falls in production; it has one of the lowest rates of enterprise unprofitability in the CIS, 
second only to Uzbekistan (Statkomitet SNG, 2002, p.215).
Some small energy rents have accrued to other post-Soviet states, in particular through 
control over pipelines and transport routes. However, these generally make only a minor 
contribution to state budgets. More important in the absence of great mineral wealth or 
saleable commodities, have been the perpetuation of elements of rentierism by resource 
transfer from Russia in the form of security rents and subsidies. 
Russia’s role as regional hegemon in place of the USSR makes it a source of security 
rent. The ability to take this rent is not universal in that Russian military involvement in 
some parts of the CIS is far from benign (Georgia, for example). The system of security 
rents is not institutionalized in the same way that it was for the Warsaw pact. The CIS 
collective security arrangements have been far less successful or extensive than the old 
alliance system with the outer empire. However, post-Soviet states have benefited from, 
first, guarantees about the stability of borders made as the USSR collapsed between the 
new partner states of the CIS, and second, from security cover and bilateral treaties with 
Moscow. Sometimes these arrangements have been explicit, as with the Russian presence 
in Tajikistan, the CIS agreements on collective security and peacekeeping, or the bilateral 
agreements with Belarus or Kyrgyzstan enabling Russian military use of facilities 9and 
US bases in the case of Kyrgyzstan, which may derive up to a fifth of its state revenue 
from US leasing of airport facilities). However, even where there were no formal 
agreements, many post-Soviet states rested under Russia’s security cover because Russia 
has continued to be a regional hegemon sufficiently strong to prevent threats from other 
states, if not from small-scale insurgency. The extent of security rents, and what there 
removal might mean, is hard to gauge. However, elsewhere in the world the de jure
recognition of statehood independent of a state’s ability to defend its sovereign status has 
clearly been related to a decline in economic regulation by elites. Where there is no 
military imperative to accumulate resources, elites are able to deploy rents that they 
control to private ends and need not involve themselves in developing other resource 
streams (Bates, 2001). Security rents therefore magnify the effect of rentierism and make 
its demise less likely.
Subsidies have taken various forms. A one off subsidy was the gradual Russian 
shouldering of the USSR’s external debts. These had been shared out by CIS states in 
March 1992, but Russia took over responsibility for the debt to secure political goals in 
the CIS over the next few years. Like Eastern Europe before them, Russia’s energy 
exports to the CIS were heavily discounted. Energy exports consistently make up 40-50 
per cent of Russian exports to the post-Soviet space (Goskomstat, 2000, pp.582, 587). In 
the first years after independence, they achieved only 30-40 per cent of the world market 
price. The net result was a loss to Russia of about 12 per cent of GDP. Russian subsidies 
in total amounted (at the lowest estimate) to 50 per cent of CIS countries’ GDP and cost 
US$17 billion (the highest estimate was US$67 billion). Further subsidies came through 
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the rouble zone and bank credits from the Russian Central Bank. These were very 
significant, ranging from 90 per cent of GDP in the case of Tajikistan to 10 per cent of 
GDP in Belarus (Ekonomika i zhizn', 1996, 16, p.1; Åslund, 1995, p.123; van Selm, 
1997, pp.108-10). Subsidies have not been provided as smoothly overtime to all post-
Soviet states as they were to Eastern Europe due to breakdowns in relations and crisis in 
the Russian economy, and as the Russian government tightened the emission of credit to 
other CIS states through the Central Bank. As some forms of subsidy have declined, 
post-Soviet states have replaced them with transfers from foreign lenders. This has lead 
to a massive build-up of debt as on average, external debt as a percentage of GDP and 
relative to exports has doubled in the post-Soviet states, especially since 1994 and the 
decline in resource transfers from Russia (EBRD, 2002). These debts have grown up as
the decline in intra-regional trade has been replaced by imports from the west. States’ 
capacity to maintain this trade is, however, itself dependent on subsidy from abroad in 
the form of cheap energy imports from Russia. The cheapness of energy inputs and 
unpaid bills enable foreign trade and its taxation. Ukraine, for example, owed Russia 
some $3.5 billion in trade debt by February 2000, with most of this outstanding amount 
being owed for gas imports. This unpaid fuel bill is a major factor that enables Ukraine to 
continue trading with the rest of the world: if fuel costs were paid, many Ukrainian 
exports would become uneconomic and unsaleable (von Zon, 2000, pp.113, 117). 
Although the Ukrainian state is not efficient at taxing trade, it does raise revenue from 
exports, particularly through licences and the arms trade. To an extent then, Ukrainian, 
and other states’, ability to take tax from foreign trade results from Russian support, and 
they have put policies in place to extract resources to fund public works. This, of course, 
is not dissimilar to the position that Eastern European states were in before 1989.
Only one state, Belarus, has been able to use both security and trade subsidies to 
buffer its population to a great degree against the economic downturn associated with 
transformation from the property state model. It was able to do this because of the degree 
to which its economy, in particular its military industrial complexes, was integrated with 
the Russian economy before 1991. Belarus has maintained its trade links with the CIS 
and in particular Russia; 60 per cent of Belarus’s exports were to the CIS in 2000, 
compared with an average for the whole CIS of 34 per cent; 89 per cent of these exports 
went to Russia. The bulk of Belarus’s imports came from the CIS and Russia too 
(Statkomitet SNG, 2000, pp.70-1). This has helped Belarus maintain one of the few 
positive balance of payments amongst non-energy producing post-Soviet states. This has 
helped to keep its GDP high relative to the communist period and the energy producing 
states; in 2001 estimated real GDP was 91 per cent of 1989 real GDP, against the CIS 
average of 64 per cent (EBRD 2002, 58). This has also meant that Belarus has been one 
of the few states not to witness a massive build-up of foreign debt. 
There has therefore been great variance between both energy dependent and non-
dependent states. There has been a tendency for resources to strengthen patrimonialism, 
but this need not be the case (as Belarus, where trade stands in for resources,
demonstrates). Most non-energy dependent economies have been able to preserve some 
aspect of rentierism sufficient to keep the social peace, avoid harsh reform decisions and 
maintain some degree of elite continuity, but, like Eastern Europe before them have done 
so in large part thanks to the transfer of resources to them from Russia. The difference 
this time is that the source of rent, Russia, is not markedly different in the form that its 
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relationship to the global economy takes than some other states. Although Russia has 
significant energy rents, these are not fully under the state’s control and as a result, they 
cannot be used to hold old patterns of rentierism and patrimonial politics in place over 
the longer term. The reason for this is the way in which Russia privatized its energy 
industries and allowed private rent seekers to replace the state as the beneficiary of 
export rents. This was done in response to the failure of the first round of reform. This 
failure meant that Russia was left with an unreformed industrial sector and a growing 
budget deficit that could not be funded by energy rents alone, especially as pressure from 
below was undermining tax gathering and perpetuating subsidies to industry. The only 
way out of this for the government in the short-term was to trade control over oil rents 
from banks in the form of direct loans and short-term debt issues. Russia’s considerable 
energy rents were not, as a result, directly under the control of the state in the 1990s, 
even though the revenue that it took from oil sales grew at the very end of the decade as 
the price of oil rose. This is still a long way from the tax state ideal, but it at least shows 
the hopeful sign that rentierism has not so far stabilized in Russia to the same extent that 
it has elsewhere in the FSU, even if the state has become more dependent on energy 
revenues, and is seeking to increase its share of them. 
CONCLUSION
Patterns of change have been very different between Eastern Euope and the CIS and 
these differences are rooted in the past, in the way that there were seeds for change under 
communism in Eastern Europe that were missing in the USSR. Relations to the global 
economy were important to this process since they changed aspects of the classic 
communist state and created constituencies for change across the state/society divide. 
This was uneven and far from complete by the time that communism collapsed in Eastern 
Europe, but it gave governments resources that they did not have in the CIS and created 
incentives for economic actors to co-operate with reform, even if it was not in their short-
term interest.  Incentives and resources for change have continued to be missing in parts 
of the USSR, although this is not uniform. Where they have been missing continuity in 
elites and anti-democratic government has often been based on the intensification of 
rentierism at the cost of development. Some resource rich states may be able to sustain 
this pattern for a long time. However, the weakness of rentierism in other states, like 
Ukraine, means that they are likely to be prone to crisis, or held hostage to Russia’s 
ability to provide subsidies and security rents. They lack the resources to ride crisis out 
without help from Russia, import crisis from Russia, and at the same time do not have the 
means to foster development and break their dependency. Russia itself, whilst displaying 
some elements of rentierism, has a diverse structure of ownership in the energy sector 
that has helped to remove part of the potential for rent from politicians’ hands. This has 
not yet created something approaching the tax state model, but it has at least raised the 
political costs of moving toward rentierism in Russia, and this, together with its fragile 
political system and electoral cycle, have helped to keep it a low-level functioning 
democracy, although not a consolidated or secure one. Given Russia, and the areas past 
and sometimes present, this represents progress of a sort.
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